Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Shaabi)
Overview
The Popular Mobilization Forces are a state-sanctioned umbrella organization of predominantly Shia militia groups in Iraq, officially established in 2014 by a fatwa from Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani to combat the Islamic State's advance across northern Iraq. While the PMF includes groups loyal to the Iraqi state and to Sistani, the most militarily significant and politically consequential factions are those aligned with Iran's IRGC — particularly Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. These Iran-aligned factions maintain dual loyalty: nominally part of the Iraqi security apparatus while operationally following direction from the IRGC Quds Force in Tehran. With approximately 100,000-150,000 fighters across all factions, the PMF represents a significant military force deeply embedded within the Iraqi state — receiving Iraqi government salaries and legally authorized to carry weapons — while simultaneously serving as Iran's most proximate proxy for attacking US military installations in Iraq and Syria. Since October 2023, Iran-aligned PMF factions have conducted over 150 rocket and drone attacks on US bases in Iraq and Syria, using Iranian-supplied Shahed drones, Katyusha rockets, and short-range ballistic missiles. This campaign imposes a persistent, low-level threat that ties down US forces in force protection rather than power projection against Iran.
History
The PMF's formal establishment in June 2014 came in response to the Islamic State's capture of Mosul and the collapse of the Iraqi army across northern Iraq. Grand Ayatollah Sistani's fatwa calling on Iraqis to defend their country generated a massive mobilization, bringing together diverse groups ranging from Sistani-loyal formations to pre-existing Iran-aligned militias that had been operating since the US occupation. Many of the Iran-aligned factions — particularly Kata'ib Hezbollah (founded 2007), Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (founded 2006), and the Badr Organization (founded 1982 by the IRGC in Iran) — had previously fought against US forces during the 2003-2011 occupation, killing hundreds of American soldiers with Iranian-supplied EFPs and IEDs. The anti-ISIS campaign provided these groups legitimacy and formal state integration: in November 2016, the Iraqi parliament passed a law recognizing the PMF as an official component of the Iraqi security forces. This legal status created an extraordinary situation — Iranian proxy fighters receiving Iraqi government salaries and legal authorization to operate as a parallel military. The January 2020 killing of Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani and PMF deputy commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis at Baghdad airport devastated the Iran-aligned PMF's leadership. Al-Muhandis had served as the critical intermediary between the Quds Force and Iraqi militia factions, and his loss fragmented coordination. Nevertheless, the organizational structures survived, and post-October 2023, Iran-aligned PMF factions resumed large-scale attacks on US installations across Iraq and Syria.
Capabilities
Primary Capabilities
The Iran-aligned PMF's primary capability is indirect fire attacks on US military installations using Iranian-supplied weapons. These include 107mm and 122mm Katyusha rockets (range 8-40km), Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 one-way attack drones (range 1,000-2,000km), short-range ballistic missiles, and improvised rocket-assisted munitions (IRAM). The factions also employ explosively formed penetrators (EFPs) — sophisticated roadside bombs that can penetrate armored vehicles — a signature Quds Force-supplied weapon that killed hundreds of US soldiers during the 2003-2011 occupation. The PMF can conduct sustained harassment campaigns, launching attacks from concealed positions within populated areas that complicate coalition response.
Secondary Capabilities
Beyond attacking US bases, the Iran-aligned PMF maintains significant conventional military capabilities including infantry, light armor (captured Iraqi army vehicles), and artillery. Their intelligence networks, some integrated with IRGC intelligence, provide surveillance on US base activities and force movements. The PMF's political wing wields substantial influence in the Iraqi parliament, controlling a significant bloc of seats that can shape Iraqi government policy on US military presence, basing agreements, and diplomatic relations with Iran. This political dimension — the ability to use the Iraqi democratic process to constrain US operations — is arguably as strategically significant as their military capability.
Notable Operations
Role in Conflict
The Iran-aligned PMF factions serve as Iran's most proximate tool for pressuring the US military presence in Iraq and Syria. Their attacks on US bases serve multiple strategic purposes for Iran: they impose force protection burdens that divert US military resources, they create political pressure in both the US and Iraq for American withdrawal, they demonstrate Iran's ability to threaten US forces without direct attribution to Tehran, and they contribute to the multi-theater 'ring of fire' strategy alongside Hezbollah, Houthi, and direct Iranian operations. The PMF's unique position within the Iraqi state creates a policy dilemma for Washington: attacking state-sanctioned Iraqi forces risks rupturing the US-Iraq bilateral relationship that is essential for maintaining American basing rights and military presence. This dual-status — simultaneously Iraqi state actors and Iranian proxy forces — is the PMF's most powerful strategic feature.
Order of Battle
The PMF umbrella includes approximately 50+ distinct militia groups, though the Iran-aligned factions are the most militarily significant. Kata'ib Hezbollah (estimated 10,000-20,000 fighters) is the most capable and loyal to Iran, with the most sophisticated weapons and deepest IRGC integration. Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq (10,000-15,000 fighters) is led by Qais al-Khazali and maintains significant political representation in the Iraqi parliament. Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada (5,000-10,000) operates primarily along the Iraq-Syria border. Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (5,000-10,000) has deployed fighters to Syria. The Badr Organization (10,000-20,000) is the oldest Iran-aligned militia, politically led by Hadi al-Amiri, and deeply integrated into Iraq's Interior Ministry and security apparatus. Non-Iran-aligned PMF factions loyal to Sistani or Iraqi nationalist in orientation account for a significant portion of total PMF personnel but are less relevant to the Iran conflict dynamic. Total PMF personnel across all factions: 100,000-150,000, though Iran-aligned factions represent perhaps 40,000-60,000 of the most operationally active fighters.
Leadership
| Name | Title | Status | Significance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Abdul Aziz al-Mohammadawi (Abu Fadak) | Operational Commander, Kata'ib Hezbollah / PMF Chief of Staff | active | Replaced Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis as the de facto operational leader of the Iran-aligned PMF. A Kata'ib Hezbollah commander with deep IRGC ties, Abu Fadak manages day-to-day military operations and coordinates with the Quds Force. US-designated terrorist. |
| Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis | Former Deputy Chairman, PMF Commission | killed | Killed alongside Soleimani on January 3, 2020. The critical link between Iran's Quds Force and Iraqi militia operations, al-Muhandis founded Kata'ib Hezbollah and served as the operational integrator for all Iran-aligned PMF factions. His death created a coordination vacuum that has never been fully filled. |
| Qais al-Khazali | Secretary-General, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq | active | Leads one of the largest Iran-aligned PMF factions while maintaining significant political representation in the Iraqi parliament. Previously detained by US forces (2007-2010) for ordering the kidnapping and murder of five US soldiers. Balances militia operations with political ambitions. |
| Hadi al-Amiri | Secretary-General, Badr Organization | active | Leader of the oldest Iran-aligned militia, founded in 1982. Former Iraqi Minister of Transport and powerful political figure. The Badr Organization controls significant portions of Iraq's security apparatus, particularly the Interior Ministry and police forces. |
| Akram al-Kaabi | Secretary-General, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba | active | Leads a faction that has deployed fighters to Syria and conducted attacks on US forces. Al-Kaabi is directly designated by the US as a terrorist and maintains close personal ties with IRGC Quds Force leadership. |
Strengths & Vulnerabilities
Relationships
The Iran-aligned PMF factions' primary external relationship is with the IRGC Quds Force, which provides weapons, funding, training, and operational direction. The relationship varies by faction: Kata'ib Hezbollah and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba are the most tightly integrated with IRGC command, while the Badr Organization maintains more political autonomy. The PMF factions operate within the broader Iraqi political system, forming electoral coalitions and controlling government ministries — the Badr Organization in particular has deep influence in the Interior Ministry and police forces. Relations with the Iraqi Prime Minister's office are complex: successive Iraqi governments have attempted to assert control over the PMF while being politically dependent on militia-affiliated parliamentary blocs. The non-Iran-aligned PMF factions (Sistani-loyal units, tribal formations) have increasingly distinct interests from the Iran-aligned groups, creating internal tensions within the broader PMF umbrella. Regionally, PMF factions have deployed fighters to Syria alongside Hezbollah and coordinated with Houthi operations through Quds Force intermediaries.
Analysis
Threat Assessment
The Iran-aligned PMF represents a persistent, low-to-medium intensity threat to US forces in Iraq and Syria. While individual attacks rarely cause mass casualties, the cumulative effect — dozens of injuries, periodic fatalities, and constant force protection requirements — degrades US operational effectiveness and creates political pressure for withdrawal. The Tower 22 attack demonstrated that PMF drone operations can achieve lethal effect against even alerted US defensive positions. The greatest strategic threat is not military but political: the PMF's ability to use Iraqi democratic institutions to constrain or terminate the US military presence in Iraq, which would undermine the entire coalition basing architecture in the region.
Future Trajectory
The PMF's trajectory is closely tied to the broader Iran conflict and Iraqi domestic politics. If the conflict de-escalates, Iran-aligned factions will likely reduce attacks on US bases while maintaining military capabilities and political influence for future leverage. If escalation continues, the factions will intensify operations, potentially targeting diplomatic facilities and economic infrastructure in addition to military bases. The key structural trend is the PMF's gradual institutionalization within the Iraqi state — as factions accumulate political power, economic interests, and social infrastructure, they become harder to dislodge regardless of military pressure. The long-term risk is Iraq becoming a semi-permanent platform for Iranian proxy operations, with Iran-aligned militias operating within the legal framework of the Iraqi state.
Key Uncertainties
- Whether the Iraqi government will genuinely attempt to constrain Iran-aligned PMF factions or continue to tolerate dual-loyalty militia operations within the state security framework
- The degree to which Kata'ib Hezbollah's announced 'suspension' of attacks on US forces reflects genuine operational decisions or temporary tactical adjustment subject to reversal
- How US retaliatory strikes against PMF targets in Iraq affect the broader US-Iraq bilateral relationship and basing agreements
- Whether the PMF's political wing will eventually dominate Iraqi governance sufficiently to formally request US military withdrawal through legitimate political processes
Frequently Asked Questions
What are the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces?
The PMF (al-Hashd al-Shaabi) is a state-sanctioned umbrella organization of predominantly Shia militia groups in Iraq, officially created in 2014 to fight ISIS. While it includes diverse factions, the most significant are Iran-aligned militias like Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and the Badr Organization that take operational direction from Iran's IRGC Quds Force. The PMF is legally part of Iraq's security forces — members receive government salaries — but Iran-aligned factions operate as dual-loyalty forces that attack US bases and advance Iranian interests.
Why are Iraqi militias attacking US bases?
Iran-aligned PMF factions attack US bases in Iraq and Syria as part of Iran's broader 'ring of fire' strategy against the coalition. The attacks serve to pressure the US toward withdrawal from Iraq, impose force protection costs that divert military resources, demonstrate Iran's ability to threaten US forces indirectly, and express solidarity with Palestinians and other Iranian strategic objectives. The attacks intensified dramatically after October 2023 in connection with the Gaza conflict and broader regional escalation.
What is Kata'ib Hezbollah in Iraq?
Kata'ib Hezbollah (Brigades of the Party of God) is the most Iran-loyal militia faction within the Iraqi PMF, founded in 2007 by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis with direct IRGC support. It is designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the United States. With an estimated 10,000-20,000 fighters, it is the best-equipped and most operationally capable PMF faction, receiving the most sophisticated Iranian weapons including one-way attack drones and guided rockets.
How many US soldiers have been killed by Iraqi militias?
During the 2003-2011 US occupation of Iraq, Iran-aligned militias killed an estimated 600+ American soldiers, primarily through IRGC-supplied EFP roadside bombs. In the current conflict period, three US soldiers were killed in the January 2024 Tower 22 drone attack, and dozens more have been wounded across the 150+ attacks on US bases since October 2023. The cumulative toll includes hundreds of traumatic brain injuries from rocket and drone attacks.
Are Iraqi PMF part of the Iraqi military?
Yes, legally. The Iraqi parliament passed a law in November 2016 integrating the PMF as an official component of the Iraqi security forces, with members receiving government salaries and legal authorization to carry weapons. However, Iran-aligned factions maintain operational independence from the Iraqi military chain of command, taking direction from IRGC Quds Force rather than the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. This dual-status — legally Iraqi but operationally Iranian — is the central paradox of the PMF.