The headline numbers on the dashboard moved sharply this week. The cause is a data uplift, not a surge in violence. This review separates the two, then looks at what has changed in the strategic picture, with a focus on the nuclear file, where the uncertainty is greatest.
Week Overview
The site now presents the conflict as a seven-month war in a fragile pause. This week's work was largely about bringing our records up to date with that reality. The static seeds behind the dashboard were refreshed to the 2 October 2026 state of the war across 18 data files, and the strike database was backfilled across a long gap in coverage.
- Cumulative strikes recorded: 761 since the conflict began.
- Cumulative casualties recorded: 8,316.
- Change in our records since the last post: 515 strikes and 6,105 casualties.
Please read that last line carefully. The 515 strikes and 6,105 casualties are the additions to our database since the previous blog post. They are not a count of events from the past seven days. The strike backfill covers 8 March to 1 October 2026 and lifted the dataset from 246 to 761 records. Readers comparing this week with earlier posts should treat the jump as a correction in coverage.
Strike Tally
The strike record stands at 761 cumulative entries. Of these, 246 were already in the database before the backfill and 515 were added during it. Because the added entries span roughly seven months, they cannot be used to measure the tempo of the last week. We have not attributed any specific strikes to this reporting period, and we will not infer a weekly rate from a catch-up exercise.
What the larger dataset does allow is a better long-run view. With the full span now populated, trend analysis on geography, actors and munition types is more reliable than it was when coverage thinned out after early March. The full list and map are on the strikes tab.
Theater by Theater
Nuclear
The nuclear file is where this week's data is most substantive. The central problem is verification. As of 1 October 2026 the IAEA cannot verify Iran's stockpile, its centrifuge inventory, or whether enrichment is suspended. It has had no access since 28 February, with a single exception, one inspection at Bushehr in June.
The figures the dashboard carries should therefore be read as assessed values, not measurements:
- Stockpile: 440.9 kg enriched up to 60%, the IAEA's June 2025 estimate, plus 184.1 kg at up to 20%. Against a 42 kg weapon threshold used on the dashboard, the quantity of material is not the constraint.
- Survival of material: more than 200 kg of the 60% material is believed, but not verified, to remain at Isfahan and Natanz.
- Centrifuges: the dashboard lists roughly 12,000 IR-1, 2,000 IR-6 and 300 IR-9 machines, none independently confirmed after the strikes.
- Enrichment status: shown as not active, resting on a US claim made on 25 February by Secretary of State Rubio that Iran is not enriching.
The facility picture is mixed. Natanz's main enrichment plant was struck on 2 March and 21 March. The IAEA said on 3 March that the bombing had not destroyed it, and that entrance damage had made it inaccessible while the underground plant remained intact. Natanz's advanced centrifuge R&D site is assessed as destroyed, and Isfahan's conversion facility as largely destroyed. Fordow's state is unverified, with no new strike or inspection reported in 2026 in the sources we reviewed.
Two signals point toward possible rebuilding. A CSIS satellite analysis in September found a clear surge in construction and record road activity at Pickaxe Mountain, which Iran denies is nuclear-related. Imagery reported by CNN and ISIS in July also suggested possible reconstruction at Parchin's Taleghan 2 site. Neither is confirmation of enrichment. Full detail is on the nuclear tab.
The dashboard's breakout figures of 2 weeks pre-strike, 12 weeks post-strike, 26 weeks for full reconstitution and 3 weeks for a covert Fordow surge are working estimates. Only the pre-strike baseline and the post-strike estimate are rated with any confidence, and the post-strike estimate was last revised in March.
Diplomacy
The political positions remain far apart. Iranian President Pezeshkian told the UN General Assembly on 22 September that Iran will retain its nuclear programme. Iran had said on 14 June that the draft deal let it dilute its highly enriched uranium inside Iran. Washington's stated demand is a handover of the material, and President Trump said on 8 April there would be no enrichment. Until that gap closes, inspectors have no mandate to return, and the verification vacuum above persists. See the diplomacy tab.
Naval, Air and Humanitarian
We are not drawing weekly conclusions for the naval, air force or humanitarian theaters in this review. Our headline feed for the period was empty, and the larger backfills do not tell us what changed this week. The cumulative casualty figure of 8,316 and its 6,105 addition are database totals, and the breakdown by country and by military or civilian status is available on the humanitarian tab. Fleet and shipping data sit on the naval tab, and sortie and loss data on the air force tab. Leadership developments are tracked under Iran leaders.
Key Trends
- The information gap is the story. Seven months into the war, the most consequential question, the status of Iran's enriched uranium, cannot be answered by the one body mandated to answer it.
- Satellite evidence is filling the vacuum. Commercial imagery analysis at Pickaxe Mountain and Parchin is now the main public indicator of nuclear activity. It is suggestive, contested and unable to show what is happening underground.
- Positions are entrenched. Iran's refusal to give up its programme and the US demand for handover of the material leave little room for a verification arrangement.
- Our own record is now more complete. The data uplift improves the quality of long-run analysis but makes week-on-week comparisons with earlier posts unreliable.
Outlook
The week ahead turns on whether any diplomatic channel produces inspector access. Without it, the breakout estimates on the dashboard will stay unchanged, because there is no new evidence to revise them. Watch for further satellite reporting on Pickaxe Mountain, any IAEA statement on access, and any change in how the US describes Iran's enrichment status. We will update the cumulative figures as new strikes and casualty reports are confirmed, and we will label any change as a recent delta so that it is not mistaken for the cumulative totals.