When the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords on the White House lawn in September 2020, proponents hailed a new era in Middle Eastern geopolitics. Israel and the Gulf Arabs, united by shared concern over Iranian expansionism, would build an open partnership combining Israeli technology and intelligence with Gulf capital and strategic geography. The US-Iran conflict is now testing whether that vision can survive the stress of actual regional war.
The Abraham Accords Framework
The 2020 normalization agreements between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain were unprecedented. For the first time, Gulf Arab states established full diplomatic relations with Israel — embassies, direct flights, trade agreements, and open security cooperation. The deals were driven by several converging factors:
- Shared Iranian threat perception — Both Israel and the Gulf states viewed Iran's missile program, nuclear ambitions, and proxy networks as existential dangers
- US pressure and incentives — The Trump administration offered F-35 sales to the UAE and security guarantees as sweeteners
- Economic opportunity — Israel's technology sector and Gulf capital markets saw mutual benefit in open collaboration
- Generational change — Younger Gulf leaders were less invested in the Palestinian cause as a defining political issue
Within months, bilateral trade between Israel and the UAE reached $2 billion annually. Israeli tourists flocked to Dubai. Defense cooperation accelerated quietly, with Israeli firms providing cyber defense, surveillance, and intelligence capabilities to Gulf partners.
The Gaza Fracture
The October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and Israel's subsequent military campaign in Gaza created the first major stress test for the accords. Public opinion across the Arab world, including in the UAE and Bahrain, turned sharply against Israel as civilian casualties mounted. Gulf governments faced intense domestic pressure to downgrade or suspend normalization.
The UAE and Bahrain chose a middle path. Both nations recalled their ambassadors temporarily and issued strong public condemnations of civilian casualties. Trade and tourism volumes dropped significantly. But critically, neither country severed diplomatic relations entirely, and intelligence-sharing channels remained open.
Saudi Arabia's anticipated normalization, which had been the prize of the Abraham Accords framework, was shelved indefinitely. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman determined that the political cost of normalizing with Israel during an active conflict that had killed tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians was simply too high, regardless of the security benefits.
The Iran War Complication
The US-Iran conflict has added a new layer of complexity. On one hand, the conflict validates the core premise of the Abraham Accords — that Israel and the Gulf states face a common Iranian threat requiring collective response. The very scenario that drove normalization is now playing out in real time, with Iranian missiles threatening Gulf cities and Israeli Arrow interceptors helping protect regional airspace.
On the other hand, the conflict has made visible Gulf-Israel cooperation politically radioactive. Iran's propaganda apparatus has seized on the Abraham Accords to portray Gulf states as Zionist collaborators, a narrative that resonates with Arab populations already outraged over Gaza. Every reported instance of Gulf-Israel intelligence sharing or military coordination becomes ammunition for Iranian information warfare.
Gulf governments are caught between strategic logic and political reality. The security cooperation enabled by normalization is more valuable than ever — Israeli early warning systems, intelligence on Iranian missile movements, and missile defense coordination are genuine force multipliers. But every public display of this cooperation risks domestic backlash and regional isolation.
Intelligence Sharing: The Hidden Backbone
The most resilient element of Gulf-Israel normalization has been intelligence cooperation, which operates largely out of public view. Israeli and Gulf intelligence services share information on:
- Iranian missile movements — Satellite and signals intelligence on launch preparations and TEL (transporter-erector-launcher) deployments
- Proxy networks — Tracking Iranian arms smuggling routes, Houthi supply chains, and Hezbollah financial networks
- Cyber threats — Joint defense against Iranian cyber operations targeting Gulf infrastructure
- Nuclear program — Israeli intelligence on Iranian enrichment activities shared with Gulf partners who face the same nuclear threat
This intelligence cooperation predates the Abraham Accords — it was happening covertly for years before normalization made it official. The formalization, however, made it faster, deeper, and more systematic, with dedicated liaison officers and real-time data sharing protocols that would not have been possible through back channels alone.
Defense Industry Connections
Israeli defense firms had established a growing presence in the Gulf before the current conflict. Companies like Rafael, Elbit Systems, and Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) were providing air defense components, surveillance systems, and cyber capabilities to UAE and Bahraini customers. The Iron Dome system was reportedly under evaluation for Gulf deployment.
The conflict has frozen public defense contracts but may have actually accelerated classified cooperation. Gulf states urgently need the counter-drone and missile defense technologies that Israeli firms specialize in, and the wartime environment has reduced bureaucratic resistance to rapid procurement. Several Israeli systems are believed to be operating in Gulf states under opaque arrangements that avoid public attribution.
The Path Forward
The Abraham Accords are unlikely to collapse entirely. The strategic logic binding Israel and the Gulf states — shared Iranian threat, complementary capabilities, American encouragement — remains intact. But the accords may settle into a "cold normalization" pattern: diplomatic relations maintained, intelligence cooperation continuing in shadows, but public engagement minimized until regional conditions improve.
Saudi normalization, the true prize, remains the key variable. If the US-Iran conflict concludes with a settlement that credibly addresses the Iranian threat, and if the Palestinian issue finds some framework for resolution, Riyadh could move forward. But those are enormous ifs, and MBS has shown he will not spend political capital on normalization until the timing favors him.
The Abraham Accords were designed for a world where the Iranian threat could be managed through partnership rather than war. The eruption of actual conflict has paradoxically proven the need for the partnership while making it harder to sustain publicly. Whether these agreements emerge from the war strengthened or hollowed out will depend on outcomes that remain, for now, impossible to predict.