Modern war is fought in two domains simultaneously: the physical battlefield and the information space. Iran has invested heavily in both, building a multi-layered information warfare apparatus that operates across state media, social platforms, proxy channels, and cyber operations. In the current conflict, this apparatus is working overtime to shape narratives domestically, regionally, and internationally.
The Domestic Information Fortress
Iran's domestic information environment is among the most controlled in the world. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) operates all television and radio channels within Iran. Independent media outlets face severe restrictions, and journalists who deviate from approved narratives risk arrest, imprisonment, or worse.
During wartime, this control has tightened further. The Supreme Council of Cyberspace — a body chaired by the president with representation from IRGC intelligence, the judiciary, and the Information Ministry — has expanded its censorship operations. Internet throttling and social media blocking, already common since the 2022 Mahsa Amini protests, have been intensified.
The domestic narrative is carefully constructed: Iran is defending itself against unprovoked aggression, the military is performing heroically, civilian casualties are the enemy's deliberate strategy, and ultimate victory is assured through divine providence and revolutionary spirit. Dissenting voices — including reports of military setbacks, civilian suffering from Iran's own decisions, or calls for negotiation — are suppressed as enemy propaganda.
International Media Operations
Iran's international information warfare operates through several coordinated channels:
- Press TV (English) and Al-Alam (Arabic) — State-owned international broadcasters that present Iran's perspective to global audiences with a veneer of journalistic production values
- Fars News Agency — Semi-official news wire service affiliated with the IRGC that produces content consumed by regional and international media
- Proxy media — Al-Manar (Hezbollah), Al-Masirah (Houthis), and various Iraqi PMF-affiliated outlets amplify Iranian narratives to regional Arabic-speaking audiences
- Sympathetic international outlets — Iran cultivates relationships with media organizations that share anti-Western editorial orientations, providing exclusive interviews, access, and content
These channels reinforce each other, creating an echo chamber where Iranian narratives are repeated across multiple seemingly independent sources — a technique that lends artificial credibility to messaging.
Social Media Warfare
Iran operates one of the world's most active state-sponsored social media influence operations. Documented campaigns have been identified and taken down by Twitter/X, Facebook/Meta, Google, and other platforms, but new networks consistently emerge.
The operations employ several techniques:
- Bot networks — Automated accounts that amplify regime-aligned content, artificially boost trending topics, and flood the zone with pro-Iran messaging during key events
- Sock puppet accounts — Human-operated fake personas that engage in seemingly organic conversation, share manipulated content, and build followings in target audience communities
- Hashtag campaigns — Coordinated efforts to make specific hashtags trend globally, particularly around civilian casualty incidents or perceived coalition failures
- Content farms — Websites disguised as independent news or analysis that produce Iran-aligned content for social media distribution
- Meme warfare — Visual content designed for sharing that conveys regime narratives in accessible, emotionally engaging formats
Telegram plays a particularly important role in Iran's information operations. The messaging platform is widely used in Iran and across the Middle East, and its group/channel functionality allows centralized content distribution to large audiences with limited platform moderation.
Key Wartime Narratives
Iran's information warfare during the conflict centers on several interlocking narratives designed for different audiences:
For domestic audiences: The nation is under attack but standing strong. Military heroes are defending the revolution. Sacrifice today ensures security tomorrow. Disloyalty aids the enemy.
For regional Arab audiences: The coalition represents Western imperialism and Israeli aggression against a Muslim nation. Arab governments supporting the coalition are betraying their people. The Axis of Resistance fights for all Muslims.
For Western audiences: Civilian casualties prove the coalition's disregard for human life. The war is illegal and unjustified. Economic costs will harm Western populations. Diplomatic alternatives exist but are being ignored.
For non-aligned audiences (Global South): This is another example of Western military adventurism. Sovereignty norms are being violated. The same powers that preach international law are ignoring it when convenient.
Cyber Operations in the Information Space
Iran's cyber capabilities complement its media operations. Documented activities include hack-and-leak operations targeting coalition military and government communications, defacement of Western media websites, distributed denial-of-service attacks on hostile media platforms, and intrusion attempts against journalists covering the conflict.
The IRGC's cyber units have been linked to operations that steal authentic documents or communications and selectively release them — sometimes modified — to create controversy, undermine trust, or expose operational details. These operations blur the line between intelligence collection, sabotage, and information warfare.
Effectiveness Assessment
Iran's information warfare is most effective where it operates within sympathetic information ecosystems. In the domestic Iranian space, regime control ensures near-total narrative dominance. In the Arab world, anti-Western sentiment provides fertile ground for Iranian messaging, though Iran's Shia identity limits its appeal in many Sunni-majority populations. In Western democracies, Iranian influence operations contribute to debate and polarization but cannot override institutional media and government communications. The overall effect is to raise costs, create confusion, and slow consensus formation — which, in a protracted conflict, serves Tehran's strategic interest in preventing a unified international response.