Iran's "Axis of Resistance" — the network of armed proxy groups stretching from Lebanon to Yemen — was designed as Tehran's first line of defense and its primary tool for projecting power across the Middle East. The current conflict has placed this entire network under simultaneous military pressure for the first time, testing its resilience and Iran's ability to coordinate multi-front operations during wartime.
Hezbollah: Degraded but Not Destroyed
Hezbollah entered the conflict as Iran's most capable proxy — a quasi-state military force with an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles, precision-guided munition capability, experienced combat veterans from Syria, and sophisticated command infrastructure in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley and southern border zone.
Israeli operations have systematically targeted Hezbollah's strategic assets. The campaign killed much of the group's senior military leadership through precision strikes, destroyed significant portions of its precision-guided missile inventory, and degraded command-and-control networks. The pager and radio attacks in late 2024 demonstrated intelligence penetration at a level Hezbollah had not anticipated.
Yet Hezbollah remains a formidable force. Its guerrilla warfare infrastructure — tunnel networks, concealed positions, and decentralized small-unit operations — is extremely difficult to fully suppress. The group retains tens of thousands of shorter-range rockets that can threaten northern Israel. And its political infrastructure in Lebanon, including social services, media, and parliamentary representation, remains intact.
The key question is sustainment. Hezbollah's ability to replace precision-guided munitions depends on Iranian resupply routes through Syria, which coalition airstrikes have severely disrupted. Without replacement of high-end weapons, Hezbollah's threat gradually diminishes from a strategic missile force to a tactical rocket and guerrilla threat.
Houthis: The Resilient Node
Ansar Allah (the Houthi movement) in Yemen has proven surprisingly resilient under coalition military pressure. Despite US and UK strikes against Houthi launch sites, radar systems, and weapons storage facilities, the group continues to launch missiles and drones at an impressive tempo.
Several factors explain Houthi resilience:
- Dispersed infrastructure — Yemen's mountainous terrain provides natural concealment, and Houthis operate from mobile platforms that are difficult to locate and target
- Low-tech, high-volume approach — Many Houthi weapons are relatively simple, making them easy to produce locally or smuggle in small quantities
- Continued Iranian resupply — Despite maritime interdiction, Iranian weapons continue reaching Yemen through overland smuggling via Oman and direct sea shipments in small vessels
- Battle-hardened forces — A decade of civil war has created experienced fighters who are accustomed to operating under air bombardment
The Houthis' Red Sea shipping campaign has been particularly consequential, forcing commercial vessels to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope and driving up global shipping costs. Anti-ship missile and drone attacks on commercial vessels have proven difficult to fully suppress, even with a multinational naval task force deployed in the region.
Iraqi PMF: The Political Complication
Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces represent Iran's most politically complex proxy relationship. Unlike Hezbollah or the Houthis, the PMF is formally integrated into Iraq's state security apparatus. PMF factions like Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba are simultaneously Iraqi government employees and Iranian-directed militant groups.
This dual identity creates severe complications for the coalition. Striking PMF positions means striking Iraqi government forces, risking a diplomatic rupture with Baghdad. The Iraqi government has repeatedly protested coalition operations on its territory, while simultaneously being unable or unwilling to prevent PMF attacks on US bases and Israeli targets.
PMF factions have launched dozens of drone and rocket attacks against US forces at Ain al-Asad and other bases in Iraq and Syria. Some factions have attempted longer-range strikes toward Israel using Iranian-supplied weapons. The tempo of these attacks has fluctuated based on Iranian direction — surging during periods of escalation and pausing during diplomatic windows.
Coordination Challenges
Iran's prewar concept of a unified multi-front response — simultaneous attacks from Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Syria to overwhelm Israeli and coalition defenses — has proven more difficult to execute in practice than in theory. Several factors have degraded coordination:
- Communications disruption — Coalition targeting of IRGC Quds Force communication networks has degraded Tehran's ability to coordinate real-time operations across multiple theaters
- Leadership attrition — The killing of senior Quds Force and proxy commanders disrupts established coordination channels
- Logistics interdiction — Syrian transit routes for weapons and supplies have been severely disrupted
- Divergent local priorities — Each proxy group faces its own local military and political pressures that may not align with Tehran's strategic priorities
Adaptation and Resilience
Despite these pressures, Iran's proxy network has demonstrated significant adaptability. Groups have shifted to more decentralized operations, reduced electronic communications in favor of human couriers, dispersed weapons stocks into smaller caches, and diversified attack methods. The network is degraded but far from defeated — and its geographic breadth continues to impose significant military costs on the coalition by requiring force dispersion across multiple theaters simultaneously.
Each proxy group has adapted in ways that reflect its local conditions. Hezbollah has shifted from centralized missile operations to distributed guerrilla tactics better suited to its degraded command structure. The Houthis have leaned into their strength in low-cost, high-volume drone and missile attacks that are difficult to suppress completely. Iraqi PMF factions have exploited their legal status within the Iraqi security forces to complicate coalition targeting decisions, blending militant operations with legitimate government functions.
The overall trajectory of Iran's proxy network points toward a more resilient but less capable force — one that can sustain harassment-level operations across multiple fronts indefinitely but may struggle to execute the kind of coordinated, multi-theater strategic strikes that Iran's prewar doctrine envisioned.