On January 3, 2020, a US MQ-9 Reaper drone strike killed Major General Qasem Soleimani outside Baghdad International Airport, eliminating the most influential Iranian military figure in a generation. Five years later, the Quds Force he built continues to operate — but the organization has been forced to evolve in ways that reflect both institutional resilience and the irreplaceable nature of Soleimani's personal networks.
Soleimani's Legacy
Understanding the post-Soleimani Quds Force requires understanding what Soleimani built. Over 22 years as commander (1998-2020), Soleimani transformed the Quds Force from a modest special operations directorate into the primary instrument of Iranian regional power projection. His approach was built on personal relationships — with Hezbollah's Hassan Nasrallah, Iraqi PMF leaders, Houthi commanders, and Syrian regime officials. These relationships enabled coordination, negotiation, and conflict resolution among diverse proxy groups in ways that institutional channels could not.
Soleimani operated more like a diplomatic envoy with military authority than a conventional military commander. He personally traveled to conflict zones, mediated disputes among proxy factions, directed battlefield operations, and maintained direct communication with Supreme Leader Khamenei. His charisma and battlefield credibility gave him influence over proxy leaders that no institutional position alone could provide.
His death removed this personal connective tissue and forced the Quds Force to institutionalize functions that had previously depended on one man's relationships.
Qaani's Challenge
Brigadier General Esmail Qaani inherited an organization optimized for a very different leader. Qaani's background was primarily in the Afghanistan-Pakistan-Central Asia portfolio — important but secondary to the Arab theater (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen) that consumed most of Soleimani's attention and generated most of the Quds Force's strategic impact.
Qaani brought different strengths: a more methodical, institution-focused management style; strong relationships in the eastern theater; and a lower personal profile that reduced the targeting risk that accompanied Soleimani's celebrity. But he initially lacked the personal bonds with Arab proxy leaders that had been Soleimani's primary instrument of influence.
The transition period (2020-2024) saw several reported coordination failures among proxy groups that sources attributed to the loss of Soleimani's mediating presence. Iraqi PMF factions jockeyed for power without his arbitration. Hezbollah and other proxies reportedly received less timely strategic guidance. The unified command tempo that Soleimani maintained across multiple theaters degraded.
Institutional Adaptation
The Quds Force has adapted to the post-Soleimani reality through several organizational reforms:
- Regional deputy empowerment — Rather than running all theaters through a single commander, Qaani empowered regional deputies with greater autonomous authority for their areas of responsibility (Lebanon/Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan)
- Communications security — Soleimani's frequent personal travel and direct communications created targeting vulnerability. The post-Soleimani Quds Force has adopted more compartmentalized communication, using intermediaries and secure channels rather than direct commander-to-proxy-leader contact
- Proxy leadership development — Increased investment in developing indigenous proxy leadership that can operate more independently, reducing the need for constant Iranian direction
- Institutional processes — Formalized coordination mechanisms that previously depended on Soleimani's personal intervention, including regular planning conferences and liaison structures
Operational Continuity
Despite the leadership transition challenges, the Quds Force has maintained operational continuity across its primary theaters. In Iraq, Iranian-aligned PMF factions continue to operate as a significant military and political force. In Syria, Iran's military presence and support to the Assad regime endured. In Yemen, the Houthi military capability continued to grow, with increasingly sophisticated weapon systems reaching the movement. In Lebanon, Hezbollah maintained its missile arsenal and military infrastructure until the 2024-2025 conflict brought direct Israeli military pressure.
The Quds Force's core functions — arms transfer, training, financial support, and strategic guidance to proxy groups — have continued under Qaani. The quality of coordination has diminished compared to the Soleimani era, but the institutional infrastructure he built has proven durable enough to function with less inspired leadership.
Wartime Stress Test
The current conflict represents the most severe test the Quds Force has faced since its founding. Multiple challenges compound simultaneously:
Leadership attrition: Coalition targeting of IRGC and Quds Force personnel has killed or wounded numerous officers, including senior figures with irreplaceable regional knowledge and relationships. Each leader lost further degrades the coordination capability that was already reduced by Soleimani's death.
Communications disruption: Electronic warfare, signals intelligence, and targeted strikes against communication nodes have degraded the Quds Force's ability to coordinate across theaters in real time.
Proxy degradation: The simultaneous military pressure on Hezbollah, Houthis, and Iraqi PMF means the Quds Force is trying to support multiple weakened partners simultaneously, stretching already stressed logistics and personnel.
Supply line interdiction: Coalition targeting of weapons transit routes through Syria, maritime smuggling networks, and border crossing points disrupts the arms transfer mission that is the Quds Force's most tangible contribution to proxy capability.
The Future of the Quds Force
The Quds Force's long-term trajectory depends on how the current conflict resolves. If Iran's proxy network emerges degraded but intact, the Quds Force will likely rebuild along the institutional lines Qaani has established — more distributed, more compartmentalized, less dependent on any single leader. If the proxy network is severely damaged, the Quds Force may need to fundamentally reinvent its operational model, potentially shifting toward more clandestine, lower-signature operations rather than the quasi-conventional proxy warfare model that Soleimani pioneered. Either way, the organization's ability to adapt through crisis suggests it will remain a consequential instrument of Iranian power projection for years to come.