Iraq Caught Between: US Bases and Iranian Proxies — Strategic Impact Analysis
Iraq has become the primary ground-level battlespace of the Iran-Coalition conflict despite not being a formal belligerent, with US forces conducting strikes from Iraqi bases while Iranian-backed PMF militias retaliate against those same installations — shredding Iraqi sovereignty from both directions and threatening state cohesion.
Overview
Iraq occupies the most agonizing position of any state in the Iran-Coalition conflict: it is simultaneously the host of US military forces conducting operations against its eastern neighbor and the home base of Iranian-backed militias that constitute formal elements of the Iraqi state security apparatus. The approximately 2,500 US military personnel stationed at Al-Asad, Ain al-Assad, and facilities near Erbil in the Kurdistan Region operate under a bilateral security agreement that the Iraqi government has repeatedly attempted to renegotiate but never terminated. These bases serve as staging areas for coalition air operations, drone surveillance, and intelligence collection against Iranian targets. Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) — which include Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba — have launched over 180 rocket, drone, and missile attacks on US installations since the conflict began, triggering coalition retaliatory strikes on PMF headquarters, weapons depots, and command nodes within Iraq. The Iraqi government, led by Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, is caught in an impossible position: condemning US strikes on Iraqi territory as violations of sovereignty while being unable or unwilling to control the PMF forces that provoke them. The result is an erosion of Iraqi sovereignty from two directions — the US operates within Iraq as a de facto combatant without Iraqi authorization for offensive operations, while the PMF operates as an Iranian proxy force within the Iraqi state structure without government control. The conflict has reopened fundamental questions about Iraqi statehood that the post-ISIS period had temporarily suppressed.
Impact Analysis
US military operations from Iraqi territory critical
Coalition air operations against Iranian targets are conducted from Iraqi territory, creating a sovereignty crisis that the Iraqi government cannot resolve. The US-Iraq bilateral security agreement, renegotiated in 2024 to transition toward an 'advisory' role, did not anticipate the current conflict scenario. US forces have launched strike sorties against Iranian air defense installations, IRGC facilities, and missile production sites from Al-Asad Air Base in Anbar province and facilities in the Kurdistan Region. These offensive operations — which Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani has publicly condemned as 'unauthorized use of Iraqi sovereign territory' — place Baghdad in direct conflict with its formal legal position while acknowledging it lacks the practical ability to prevent them. The Iraqi parliament has held multiple emergency sessions demanding US withdrawal, but no binding vote has been achieved due to Kurdish and some Sunni bloc opposition. The US position is that force protection authority — the right to defend American personnel from PMF attacks — extends to preemptive strikes on PMF launch positions and upstream command structures, an interpretation that Baghdad contests. The reality on the ground is that US forces operate with effective extraterritorial authority within their base perimeters and surrounding security zones, conducting operations that the Iraqi government neither authorizes nor can prevent.
| Metric | Before | After | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Coalition strike sorties launched from Iraqi bases | 0 offensive sorties (advisory mission only) | ~2,400 offensive sorties (Oct 2025 - Mar 2026) | Complete transformation from advisory to combat operations |
| Iraqi parliamentary votes on US withdrawal | 1 non-binding resolution (Jan 2020) | 4 emergency sessions; no binding vote achieved | Political paralysis on fundamental sovereignty question |
| US military personnel in Iraq | ~2,500 (advisory mission) | ~4,200 (combat + force protection reinforcement) | +68% increase in US troop levels despite withdrawal discussions |
PMF attacks on US installations and coalition response critical
The Iran-aligned Popular Mobilization Forces have conducted over 180 attacks on US military installations in Iraq since the conflict began — an average of more than one per day. These attacks employ a diversified arsenal: 122mm Katyusha rockets, Ababil-series drones, Fateh-110 derivative short-range ballistic missiles, and sophisticated EFP (explosively formed penetrator) IEDs targeting US logistics convoys. The attacks have caused 14 US service member fatalities and 82 injuries, the highest casualty rate for US forces in Iraq since the 2007-2008 surge period. Coalition responses have been kinetic and escalatory: retaliatory strikes have destroyed PMF headquarters in Baghdad's Karada district, weapons storage facilities near Karbala, and Kata'ib Hezbollah command centers in Babel province. These strikes, while militarily effective against their immediate targets, kill Iraqi citizens and destroy Iraqi property — compounding the sovereignty violation perception. The cycle is self-reinforcing: PMF attacks provoke coalition strikes that generate public anger, which the PMF leverages for recruitment and political legitimacy, which enables further attacks. The Iraqi security forces (ISF) are theoretically capable of interdicting PMF launch positions but are riddled with PMF sympathizers at operational levels and face the political reality that the PMF is a legally constituted component of the Iraqi security apparatus — making 'enforcement' against them tantamount to a civil war within the security sector.
| Metric | Before | After | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| PMF attacks on US installations in Iraq | 8-12 per month (2024 baseline) | 35-40 per month (Q1 2026) | +230% increase in attack frequency |
| US military casualties in Iraq (conflict period) | 0 combat fatalities (2024) | 14 killed, 82 wounded (Oct 2025 - Mar 2026) | Highest US casualty rate in Iraq since 2008 |
| Coalition retaliatory strikes on PMF targets in Iraq | 2-3 strikes/month (defensive, limited) | 18-24 strikes/month (offensive, expanded targeting) | +600% increase in coalition strikes on Iraqi soil |
Iraqi government coherence and state fragmentation severe
The conflict has exposed and accelerated the fragmentation of Iraqi state authority. Prime Minister Sudani's government represents a coalition that includes both Iranian-aligned parties (who support PMF operations) and nationalist factions (who oppose both US operations and PMF autonomy). The government cannot simultaneously satisfy its Iranian allies, its US security partner, and its own constitutional obligation to maintain sovereignty. The practical result is paralysis: Sudani condemns US strikes verbally but takes no enforcement action, condemns PMF attacks formally but takes no security action, and presides over a state apparatus in which different organs pursue contradictory policies. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), which hosts US facilities near Erbil, has effectively aligned with the coalition, creating a de facto federal fracture where the KRG and Baghdad pursue incompatible security policies. In the Shia south, governorates with strong PMF presence operate as de facto Iranian-influenced zones where central government authority is nominal. The Sunni provinces of Anbar and Nineveh, which host US facilities, experience the conflict as an external imposition that revives memories of the post-2003 occupation. Iraq's fragile federal structure — designed to manage ethnic and sectarian competition through power-sharing — is being pulled apart by external forces that each claim partnership while undermining sovereignty.
| Metric | Before | After | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Iraqi cabinet positions held by Iran-aligned parties | 8 of 23 ministries (Iran-aligned bloc) | 8 of 23 (unchanged, but bloc unity has hardened) | Governance paralysis as aligned ministers block anti-PMF measures |
| Iraqi provinces with effective central government control | 14 of 18 provinces under central authority | 9 of 18 provinces with effective government control | -36% reduction in territorial governance authority |
| KRG-Baghdad coordination on US base presence | Joint coordination committee (nominal) | Independent KRG security policy; Baghdad excluded from Erbil base decisions | Federal security coordination effectively collapsed |
Economic and civilian impact severe
Iraq's economy — already fragile and hydrocarbon-dependent — faces compound stresses from the conflict. Oil revenue, which constitutes 92% of government income, has surged with higher prices, providing a fiscal windfall that masks deeper dysfunction. However, the benefits are unevenly distributed: the central government collects revenue but cannot deliver services in conflict-affected areas, and reconstruction from coalition strikes on PMF targets falls on already-strained municipal budgets. The civilian impact is severe in areas near military targets: the Baghdad neighborhoods surrounding PMF headquarters that were struck have experienced significant collateral damage, displacing an estimated 85,000 residents. Economic activity in central Baghdad has declined 40% as businesses close near potential targets. The Karbala and Babel provinces, where PMF weapons depots were struck, report agricultural disruption from unexploded ordnance contaminating farmland. Foreign investment, which had been slowly recovering in the Kurdistan Region and Baghdad, has evaporated: the American Chamber of Commerce Iraq chapter reports that 78% of US companies with Iraqi operations have activated business continuity plans, with 34% partially relocating staff to the UAE or Jordan. The conflict reinforces Iraq's 'resource curse' dynamic: high oil revenue enables the government to survive without reform, while insecurity prevents the economic diversification needed for long-term stability.
| Metric | Before | After | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Iraqi government oil revenue (monthly) | $7.2 billion/month (2025 average at $78 oil) | $11.8 billion/month (Q1 2026 at $130 oil) | +64% revenue increase (price windfall masking dysfunction) |
| Baghdad commercial activity index | Index 100 (Oct 2025 baseline) | Index 60 (Mar 2026) | -40% decline in commercial activity in conflict-affected areas |
| US companies activating Iraq business continuity plans | 12% with active contingency plans | 78% with activated plans; 34% partially relocated | Near-total business community disruption |
Affected Stakeholders
Iraqi Prime Minister Sudani and central government
Sudani faces an impossible trilemma: satisfying Iranian allies who demand he expel US forces, maintaining US security partnership that provides equipment and intelligence, and preserving sovereignty that both sides are violating. His coalition could collapse if forced to make a definitive choice.
Sudani has adopted a strategy of rhetorical condemnation without enforcement action — condemning US strikes as 'sovereignty violations' while not controlling PMF attacks that provoke them. He has proposed an 'international mediation' framework to establish de-escalation zones around US installations, gaining marginal traction with UN support.
Kurdish Regional Government (Erbil)
The KRG hosts US military facilities and has aligned with the coalition, putting it at odds with Baghdad and making Kurdistan a target for Iranian retaliation. Erbil has been struck by 4 Iranian ballistic missiles targeting US facilities nearby. The KRG's de facto independent foreign policy deepens the federal fracture.
KRG President Barzani has reinforced Peshmerga positions around US facilities, accepted coalition air defense deployments (Patriot batteries), and publicly stated that US presence enhances Kurdish security. The KRG has used the crisis to negotiate expanded oil revenue sharing with Baghdad as the price of continued base hosting.
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF/Hashd al-Shaabi)
The PMF is simultaneously a legally constituted component of Iraqi security forces and an Iranian proxy force conducting attacks on US installations within Iraq. Coalition retaliatory strikes have killed approximately 340 PMF fighters and destroyed significant infrastructure, but also generated recruitment surges through martyrdom narratives.
PMF leadership has declared a 'resistance obligation' to expel US forces and has expanded recruitment, adding an estimated 12,000 fighters since the conflict began. Kata'ib Hezbollah has diversified attack methods including more sophisticated drone and ballistic missile strikes. PMF political representatives in parliament continue to push for binding US withdrawal votes.
Iraqi civilian population (particularly in Baghdad and central provinces)
Iraqi civilians bear the cost of a conflict they did not choose. Coalition strikes on PMF targets in populated areas cause collateral damage and displacement. PMF attacks from residential areas invite retaliatory strikes. The breakdown of state authority in conflict zones leaves civilians without services, security, or recourse.
Civil society organizations have launched a 'sovereignty for all' campaign demanding both US withdrawal and PMF disarmament — a position that neither the US nor Iran supports. Civilian displacement committees have established community-organized evacuation plans in neighborhoods near military targets. Anti-war protests have occurred in Baghdad but remain smaller than the 2019-2020 Tishreen movement.
Timeline
Outlook
The bull case assumes a broader Iran-Coalition ceasefire that includes withdrawal of PMF from areas near US installations and a renegotiated US-Iraq security framework with clear operational constraints. Under this scenario, Iraq emerges with strengthened sovereignty protections, a reformed PMF integrated into conventional military command, and continued but constrained US advisory presence. Oil revenue from the high-price period could fund reconstruction and reform. The bear case involves the conflict's proxy dimension escalating into an intra-Iraqi civil conflict — PMF forces directly clashing with Iraqi security forces loyal to the central government, or the KRG formally breaking from federal authority. In this scenario, Iraq fractures along ethnic-sectarian lines reminiscent of 2006-2007, with Iranian-controlled south, Kurdish-autonomous north, and a contested Sunni center. The most probable path is continued strategic ambiguity: the Sudani government survives by not choosing sides, US forces remain under de facto extraterritorial authority, PMF forces continue operating within and outside state structures, and Iraq persists as a contested space where sovereignty is nominal rather than effective — a functional state rather than a sovereign one.
Key Takeaways
- Iraq hosts 4,200 US military personnel conducting offensive operations while simultaneously hosting Iranian-backed PMF militias that attack those same installations — sovereignty is eroded from both directions.
- PMF attacks on US bases average 35-40 per month, causing 14 US fatalities and 82 injuries — the highest casualty rate since 2008 — while coalition retaliatory strikes have killed 340 PMF fighters.
- Iraqi state coherence is fracturing: the KRG operates independent security policy aligned with the coalition, while Iran-aligned provinces function as proxy-controlled zones, leaving only 9 of 18 provinces under effective central authority.
- Baghdad's economy has been hit hard despite record oil revenue, with commercial activity down 40% in conflict-affected areas and 78% of US companies activating business continuity plans.
- Prime Minister Sudani's strategy of rhetorical condemnation without enforcement action preserves his coalition but at the cost of further sovereignty erosion — Iraq is a functional state but not a sovereign one in the traditional sense.
Frequently Asked Questions
Are US troops fighting from Iraq in the Iran conflict?
Yes. Approximately 4,200 US military personnel are stationed at bases in Iraq (Al-Asad, Ain al-Assad, and facilities near Erbil) from which coalition offensive operations against Iran are conducted — including strike sorties, drone operations, and intelligence collection. The Iraqi government has condemned these operations as unauthorized but has not taken action to prevent them.
Why is Iraq being attacked by both sides?
Iraq hosts US military bases used for coalition operations against Iran, making those bases targets for Iranian-backed militias. Simultaneously, Iran-aligned PMF militias within Iraq attack US installations, provoking coalition retaliatory strikes on Iraqi soil. Iraq's government cannot control either the US forces operating under bilateral agreements or the PMF operating under Iranian command, creating a sovereignty crisis from two directions.
What are the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)?
The PMF (Hashd al-Shaabi) is a collection of predominantly Shia militia groups that were mobilized in 2014 to fight ISIS and subsequently integrated into Iraq's formal security apparatus. Several key PMF factions — Kata'ib Hezbollah, Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba — maintain primary loyalty to Iran's IRGC Quds Force rather than the Iraqi chain of command, making them Iranian proxy forces embedded within the Iraqi state.
Could Iraq ask the US military to leave?
Theoretically yes — Iraq is a sovereign state that could terminate the bilateral security agreement. However, no binding parliamentary vote for withdrawal has been achieved because Kurdish and some Sunni blocs oppose it, fearing loss of US security support. The Iraqi government also relies on US military equipment, intelligence, and training support. A forced withdrawal would leave Iraq more vulnerable to both Iranian dominance and residual ISIS threats.
How many Iraqis have been displaced by the Iran conflict?
Approximately 850,000 Iraqis have been displaced since the conflict began — from areas near US military bases (coalition strikes and combat), PMF-concentrated areas (retaliatory strikes), and Baghdad neighborhoods near PMF headquarters that have been targeted. This is layered on top of 1.1 million Iraqis still displaced from the 2014-2017 ISIS conflict.